teaching and research staff, visiting professors, graduate students, visiting fellows, and invited participants in seminars, workshops, and conferences. As usual, authors bear full responsibility for the content of their contributions. 
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Introduction
One of the more accepted definitions of a party system looks at it as the sum of all relevant parties of a political system plus the relations they have with one another (Sartori, 1976 ).
This definition gains complexity when applied to the multi-level system of governance of the European Union. 1 What is a European Union party? For being an EU party, does it require to be based on an 'own' EU-wide extra-parliamentary organisation? Does an EU party, itself, need to "present at elections, and be capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office" (as Sartori put it in his seminal definition of a political party)? What if national and local member parties in their place nominate candidates and in local campaigns compete for votes, does this harm the notion of EU parties, of an EU party system and of a democratic EU-wide party competition?
2
The contrary seems to be the case. In order to properly recognise the multi-level nature of the EU party system, we need to consider EU-national party relations (between EPP and CDU, for example) as much a part of it as EU-EU party relations (like those between EPP and PSE), and even national-national relations (between the French PS and British Labour, or between VVD and D'66) are a part of the overall picture. Cross-level party relations in particular might attract strategic conflict and policy disagreement. But local autonomy and regional variation is a fact of life in many national party systems as well, and must therefore not be seen as holding-up the efficient functioning of the overall system.
If we accept the notion of a multi-level party system, with some functions allocated in local party organisations, others at the national level, and still others at the level of the European Union, the question of compatibility of the different layers of the party system arises. Building an overall EU party system upon those of the EU member countries obviously requires some basic structural similarity between them. One school of thought argues, in the Rokkanian tradition, that this compatibility has been granted in the past by a roughly similar cleavage structure which gave western European party systems their particular shape (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) . At the time of suffrage expansion, i.e. at a time when social cleavages were first translated into (mass) electoral alliances, the basic and most salient socio-political conflict was fought between industrial labour and capital. This has led almost everywhere to the formation of labour unions and, in the political and parliamentary sphere, of a labour party (or a socialist or social democratic party) which opposed the liberal and conservative (or Christian-democratic) forces that were more or less closely allied with entrepreneurial 1 See on multi-level systems of governance e.g. König et al. (1996) , Kohler-Koch and Eisig (1998) , or Hooghe and Marks (2001) . 2 Transposed to the European level, it suggests that Estonian or Portuguese EP candidates -to name just two geographically distant member nationalities -must not be selected in Brussels by a central party authority. In fact, there are good normative democratic reasons (going back to the participation rights of local members and supporters) why they should not be selected centrally but locally (e.g. Abendroth, 1964 countries were entitled to vote. The question that we will pursue in this paper is whether these new post-communist party systems are sufficiently similar to the western European 'model' in order to be easily integrated. Put in another way, we are asking whether the eastward enlargement might have weakened the EU party system -characteristic dimensions of its strength having been the relative concentration of the party system, and the distinctiveness and cohesion of its constituent parts.
The EU Party System before May 1, 2004
During its first five decades, the EU party system was a remarkably efficient device for integrating a host of new entrants into a rather 'slim' structure. Just before eastern enlargement, the EU party system integrates about 130 national parties in not more than five consolidated party groups, and in two less consolidated but minor 'ideological areas' -the euro-sceptic right-of-centre, and the far-right. And these numbers, as small as they are, still give a false impression of the format of the EU party system which is essentially characterised by two predominant political groups -the PES on the left, and the EPP on the right.
In the world of party systems at least, small numbers are good numbers. They signify governability, centripetal competition, alternation of governments, accountability -all the good things of the two-party model of governance are associated with them. The format of the EU party system which goes all the way back to the Common Assembly of the ECSC of 1953 should therefore not stand in the way of a democratic EU polity.
But of course, the 'democratic potential' of a party system does not only depend on a small numbers of parties and on party system concentration. It also depends on the distinctiveness and cohesion of its partisan actors. But here as well, empirical analyses of political preferences and behaviours of samples of EP-voters and of various branches of party elites (Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999; , of content analyses of political parties' election programmes issued at the occasion of European Parliament elections (Thomassen & Schmitt, 2004; Wüst & Schmitt, 2005) , and of analyses of roll-call analyses of members of this parliament (Hix, 2002; Kreppel & Hix, 2003) all have revealed that this party system works surprisingly 'normal'. No matter what data source is analysed, political groups are 'distinct', which is to say that they differ from one another in policy and ideological terms. And despite their enormous performance in integrating new members, these groups are also astonishingly 'cohesive', which is to say that their constituent parts are comparatively similar in policy and ideological terms. What is more, distinct and cohesive EP groups base their parliamentary vote increasingly upon ideological distance. It seems that 'grand coalition' strategies that were pursued in the past by the two major players of the system, the EPP and the PES, in order to increase the powers of the parliament vis à vis the council have become less popular (Kreppel & Hix, 2003) .
In short, this party system was 'ready for power' (Hix, 2002) European parties to the EU system, thus elevating the overall number to some 170 national parties sending delegations to the European Parliament.
The Party Systems of East Central Europe -Do They Fit In?
The basic structure of west European party systems has been defined by socio-political cleavages. These cleavages were translated into partisan alignments more or less at the time when universal suffrage was achieved. In most places, this happened around the late 19 th and the early 20 th century. But what about the central and east European systems that democratised -or re-democratised (Agh, 1998a) -only in the early 1990s? As a matter of fact, competitive party systems emerged very rapidly in these countries. But do they rest upon socio-political cleavages, or on less stable pillars like specific issue alliances or the personal charisma of political elites that predominated during regime change?
The latter assumption, sometimes referred to as the tabula rasa theory, has received little empirical support (Kitschelt et al., 1999) . Actually, there seems to be a stable structure of social divisions (Evans and Whitefield, 2000) , while the political sphere is still characterised by substantial levels of volatility both on the side of the voters and on the parties' side (e.g. Birch, 2001 ). This reminds us of the fact that social divisions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for socio-political cleavages. As Bartolini and Mair (1990: 216) This is what Ágh (1998b) and, following him, Oppelland (2003) refer to when they identify two overarching conflict dimensions and four phases of party system development in Central and Eastern Europe. 9 The first phase, ranging from the collapse of communist regimes to the first more or less free elections, was characterised by one dominant ideological division:
the one that separated communists from anti-communists or, perhaps more precisely, 8 See in this context also Sitter (2002) who highlights the impact of party (leader) strategy on party system stability and change. 9
Note that this overall perspective necessarily ignores local particularities. See again Kitschelt et al. (1999) for a detailed analysis of the historical path dependency of the specifics of post-communist politics in four nations.
supporters and opponents of the ancien regime. During that period, spontaneous idealistic mass movements formed and soon transformed into 'umbrella parties' which served to unite and strengthen the anti-communist forces.
In the second phase, roughly the first half of the 1990ies, the previously dominant ideological conflict line between communists and anti-communists was supplanted, or supplemented, by a new conflict line between the winners and losers of the economic transformation from 'central planning' to 'free market' economy. The former umbrella parties disintegrated as soon as truly free elections were held. Anti-communist parties, formerly united within an 'umbrella', formed mostly unstable coalition governments. A great number of parties with a narrow popular base gained representation in parliament.
During the third phase which occupies the second half of the 1990s social conflicts between winners and losers of the transition to market economy aggravated. The political result of the second free election which often fell in this phase was that social-democratic successors of the former communist party took over in many places. In structural terms the post-communist party systems concentrated, while electoral volatility was extremely high in that period.
The fourth and currently last phase that extends over the early 2000s did not alter the main conflict lines. Post-communist social-democrats lost where they failed to deliver on their promises. Despite these changes, the political camps of the third phase proved to be stable and the number of parties in parliament did not rise again. In this phase, a relatively stable and modestly concentrated party system has emerged that seems to be organised along the familiar left-right scheme. Based upon this observation, Oppeland (2003) would not easily associate with one of the major political groups of the house.
Dimensions of Party Competition in the European Union
Before we go on and test the actual fit between parties and party systems from old and new EU member countries in the European Parliament after the 2004 election, we need to be clear about what we want to look at. There is a considerable literature on the dimensionality of the European party space. 10 Gabel and Hix (2002) and Gabel and Anderson (2002) identify some variant of the left-right scheme as the one dimension that structures the European political space. For Hix and Lord (1997) and Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) , two orthogonal dimensions structure the European political space: these are the left-right axis and a dimension of EU support or opposition. 11 Others, like Gary Marks cum suis, arrive at a three-dimensional picture of ideological divisions: economic left-right, new politics, and again the dimension of EU support (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2004) .
Some of this scholarly dissent may originate in technicalities -in different methods applied, different sorts of data used, and so on. 12 This certainly calls for a critical evaluation.
However, rather than methodologically, we intend to proceed conceptually. We propose that the issues that are dealt with at the EU level of the European multi-level system fall into two categories: constitutional issues and ordinary ones (Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999) .
Constitutional issues are about the structure of the evolving political system of the European Union. The relations between Parliament, Commission and Council are part of it;
enlargements and the question of admission of new members are another; the constitutional process and EU-treaties more generally are a third; more examples could easily be added.
These constitutional issues are not about EU policies, but about the EU polity. A characteristic point of dissent is about more or less integration.
In contrast to these constitutional struggles, ordinary issues are about concrete policies.
They tend to (but do not have to) assume a multi-level nature in the sense that they are discussed and dealt with at various levels of the EU multi-level system of governance.
Examples are the economy, the welfare state, the environment, and so on. For those 'ordinary' issues, an 'ordinary' measure of ideological conflict should apply. The most prominent of those is the left-right dimension. A wide variety of conflicts relate to it: political (equality vs. hierarchy), economic (poor vs. rich), religious (abstainers vs. believers), and time oriented (change vs. continuity; see Laponce, 1981; also Bobbio, 1996) . Due to the 10 See e.g. the special issue of Comparative Political Studies (Vol. 35, No. 8) for an excellent overview on the topic. 11 'Scepticism' is the en vogue term, see Taggart and Szerbiak (2005a; 2005b) . 12 Some of the cited research pieces use complex factor analytical techniques while others look at bivariate associations. Part of them is based on representative surveys of party voters and party elites, others use party programmes as a source of information, and still others rely on expert judgements on where the parties are (or were at some point in recent history) on a number of issue and ideological dimensions. Some of the survey based work uses broad summary indicators, while others analyse a multitude of subtle judgements (danger of non-attitudes). All of these differences might have an impact on the findings.
'imperialistic' character of this ideological scheme (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990) do not follow the work of Hooghe and Marks (Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2004) . In the present paper, we refrain from distinguishing different dimensions of the left-right divide and concentrate on the one overarching ideological cleavage. Together with the EU dimension (furthering vs. moving back European integration), these are the two dimensions of party competition that we will concentrate on in the following analysis.
13 Needless to say that this general statement applies in particular in periods of regime change like the breakdown of communism in the former Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact (see e.g. Evans and Whitefield, 1998) .
Data
Before we finally move on and test the fit between parties and party systems from old and new EU member countries in the European Parliament, we need to say a word on the database that we rely on in the present paper. While we start out with a look at official election statistics, the core of our empirical evidence comes from the European Elections In the present paper, we analyse only two of the many concepts that are operationalised in this study: popular perceptions of the location of nationally relevant parties on (a) the proanti-EU dimension 18 and on (b) the left-right dimension
19
. We do so by computing measures 14 While Malta is the only member-country that was not covered this study, there are two countries with more than one representative survey: Belgium (both a Flemish and a Wallon sample of voters has been interviewed) and the United Kingdom (with two separate studies, one for Great Britain and one for Northern Ireland). 15 In many of the west European EU member-countries, a telephone survey methodology was used. By contrast, in many of the new eastern member-countries face-to-face interviews were preferred. In Ireland, Italy and Sweden, a postal survey was conducted. Note that in the Swedish study an eleven point scale (from 0 to 10) was used and that respondents were asked whether they agree with or oppose Sweden's EU membership, and where they locate the Swedish parties on this scale. We tried to adjust the different scale format by collapsing scale categories '0' and '1' into scale category '1'. The Belgian survey did not ask this question which is why Belgian parties cannot be considered in this analysis. Here as well, the Swedish study used an eleven point scale, which we tried to adjust as described in the previous footnote. 20 We are aware that for particularly skewed distributions, mean scores and standard deviations may suggest misleading results. This is why a next draft will compare the present findings with those that interpolated medians and agreement scores would have yielded. 21 Van der Brug and van der Eijk (1999) have shown that voters' perceptions of party locations (the latter being operationalised by party elite perceptions of where the party is) are relatively accurate as long as general policy and, in particular, ideological dimensions are concerned. We believe that both the EU-dimension and the leftright dimension that are analysed here are of such a general nature and that party positions can reliably estimated on the basis of representative mass surveys. 22 Note that Northern Irish parties are still lacking in the present analyses.
Findings
The 2004 Election Result -East and West compared
We begin with a basic look at official election result figures. The question we try to shed light on is: how different was the eastern vote? For a start, we distinguish between votes that were given to any of the parties involved in an EP group ('any EP group'), votes that were given to a party that gained representation but did not join one of the groups ('non-inscrits'), votes that were given to a party that did not master the threshold of representation ('not represented'), and finally those that abstained ('non voters'). The result of our computations is obvious: 'Post-communist' voters are heavily over-represented among non-voters and among voters of parties that did not join an EP group, while they are clearly underrepresented in the electorates of parties that did join one of the established political groups of the European Parliament. The proportion of unrepresented votes is virtually identical in East and West (Table 1) . the East, and certainly much less dramatic than some authors suggested (e.g. Beichelt, 2004) . Quite spectacular, however, is the lack of a green electorate among post-communist voters, and, as we have seen before, the fact that many of the Eastern votes elected representatives who could not decide which parliamentary party to join (Table 2) . Table 2 The Distribution of Votes between EP groups (Table 3) . 
The European Union Party System before and after Enlargement
As we have already seen, the 2004 election of the European Parliament has strengthened the Christian-conservative group, and it has weakened the left broadly speaking. Eastern enlargement has significantly contributed to these developments. But over and above the political result of the election, did enlargement change the structure of the party system? Are EP groups less distinct and cohesive now? And what about the structure of party competition?
The short answer is: Eastern enlargement has done surprisingly little to the EU party system. 2005) . Note that the 'raw data' analysed here is the mean score of the pro-anti EU placements that national respondents assigned to each party. (a) The weighting factor applied is the number of representatives that a party sends to Strasbourg so that a large party counts more (in the computation of the mean and standard deviation scores) than a small party.
When Eastern enlargement did not affect the positioning of the EP groups along the left-right and the pro-anti-EU dimension, it still could have had an impact on the relation between these two basic dimensions of party competition in the European Parliament. In the past, there was all but consensus among scholars in this domain. The basic point of dissent has been whether left-right orientations determine pro-anti-EU positions (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002) , or whether the two are independent from and orthogonal towards one another (e.g. Hix and Lord, 1997) . 23 Our data suggest that the two dimensions are only weakly correlated (r=.282, p=.000, n=158), and that this correlation is virtually identical for Western (r=.267, n=109, p=.005) and Eastern (r=.276, n=49, p=.055) parties.
Graph 1 displays this modest but significant association between the two variables graphically. It suggests that political parties have a somewhat higher chance for Europositive orientations the more to the right they are located. But the model fit is indeed very poor and one is probably right in describing the EU political space as two dimensional, with left-right orientations and pro-anti-EU attitudes independently structuring it.
23 Note that this dissent could again originate in the different data sources that are used. While expert survey analyses seem to report a substantial correlation between the two dimensions (e.g. Whitefield et al., 2005) , analyses of mass survey data usually tend to the opposite conclusion (e.g. Schmitt and Thomassen, 2000) . In the present context, in any case, the most important finding is that the two dimensions are as dependent or independent in Eastern as in Western parties. This also implies that the structure of party competition in the European Parliament was hardly affected by the 'big bang' of May 2004.
Graph 2 displays the familiar 'horseshoe': the gravity line of EU party competition that was first introduced by Hix and Lord (1997) . While there is a considerable spread of EP group positions along the left-right dimension, variation along the pro-anti-EU dimension is less pronounced. Nevertheless, far-left and far-right parties tend to be somewhat more sceptical about the European Union than centre-left and centre-right parties. The latter also tend to be the larger ones, which might have nurtured the impression that there was hardly any choice offered to the voter in European Parliament elections.
Would we distinguish Eastern and Western member parties of EP groups and display them separately, the pictures would be much the same -with one significant difference though.
The overall 'centre-right' location of the 'Non Inscrits (NI)' would be on the 'far right' for Western members only, and it would be in the 'centre' for new Eastern members only. If this 'technical group' is united by anything, it is certainly not the left-right ideology.
Graph 2 
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Conclusion
Surprisingly enough, the EU party system has not changed much as a result of Eastern enlargement. The EPP-ED has gained additional strength, both PES and the Far Left suffered, and the proportion of unaffiliated members has increased due to the fact, that a good number of Eastern members did not join one of the traditional political groups.
However, the cohesiveness of EP groups did not visibly suffer from the addition of new 'postcommunist' members, nor did the distinctiveness of the parties decline. The 'horseshoe'-like gravity line of EU party competition is very much the same before and after eastern enlargement, with centre-left and centre-right groups more in favour of further integration than far-left and far-right groups.
Some party system consequences of eastward enlargement of the EU may not yet be fully visible. Eastern party systems are still in flux, with a limited reach of electoral politics in general, high levels of volatility among those who do participate, and a significantly greater diversity of partisan actors than in the West. To the degree that these transitory characteristics of eastern party systems are declining, one might expect the eastern vote to undergo significant changes in the future.
One expectation in particular was not born out by the election. In the political process of the new eastern member-countries, the issue of EU membership was much less politicised, and the strength of EU sceptical parties much less pronounced, than was predicted by many.
Bielasiak can probably explain part of it when he writes that " […] there is a tension between the notion that the party systems of post-communism render the integration issue relevant to the competitive process, and the acknowledgement of a long-standing broad policy consensus on the 'return to Europe'" (2004: 1) . As a result, "[…] the integration question has remained largely a second-order political concern rather than a primary contestation issue in the charged competitive dimension of the former communist states. " (2004: 22) Phenomena of below-average electoral participation and unsuccessful integration of elected members in established EP groups aside, the integration of the parties from the new countries worked out comparatively smoothly. Was this the case despite of major ideological discrepancies, as Kreppel and Gungor (2004) propose? They argue that integration of the new members should cause little problem because they are all coming from backgrounds characterised by strong parliaments and weak parties -much as the EU parliamentary and party system. While this might be the case, our analysis has shown that ideology was not a major obstacle, but rather a catalyst for adaptation and integration.
